Abstract. In this paper we prove the existence of ^-equilibrium stationary strategies for non-zero-sum stochastic games when the reward functions and transitions satisfy certain separability conditions. We also prove some results for positive and discounted zero-sum stochastic games when the state space is infinite.
Introduction. A stochastic game is determined by five objects: S, A, B, q, r. Here S is a nonempty Borel subset of a Polish space, the set of states of the system. A is a nonempty Borel subset of a Polish space, the set of actions available to player I; B is the set of actions for player II. The law of motion q associates Borel measurably with each is, a, b) E S X A X B a probability measure on the Borel subsets of S. Let r¡(s, a, b), i = 1, 2, be the reward functions for I and II, respectively, when s is the state and a, b are the actions of I and IL As a consequence of the actions chosen by the players, two things happen: players I and II receive rxis, a, b), r2is, a, b) and the system moves to a new state s' according to qi-\s, a, b). Then the whole process is repeated from the new state s'. The problem is to find whether they have suitable Nash equilibrium strategies.
A strategy II for I is a sequence (II,, TL2, . . .) where Hn specifies the action to be chosen on the Aith day depending on the past history. A strategy n is called stationary if there is a Borel map /: S -> PA (the class of all probability distributions on A) such that Iln = / for all ai. Similarly, strategies and stationary strategies are defined for II.
Let ß be a fixed number with 0 < ß < 1. A pair (n, T) of strategies for I and II associates with each initial state s an nth day expected income r^"\Tl, T)is) for player ¡' and a total expected discounted income for player i: 00 7,.(n,r)(.)= 2 j8"-'r/w(n,r)(i).
n=\
In case rx= -r2 = r, we will call such games discounted zero-sum stochastic games. In case r > 0 and ß = 1, we will simply call them positive stochastic games.
Let p be a fixed probability distribution on S. We call (II*, T*) a /^-equilibrium pair if p{s:IxiU*, T*)(s) > 7,(n,r*)(j) for ail n, 72(n*, r*)(i) > 72(n*, r)(j) for ail r} = 1.
[Here, in general, the set in braces need not be Borel measurable, but it will be universally measurable.] For the case rx = -r2, U* is optimal for I if 7 (IP, r)(j) > inf sup 7 (n, T)is) for all T and s, r n and T* is optimal for II if 7 (IT, T*)(s) < sup inf 7 (II, r)(j) for all n and s. Theorem 2. Let S be any Borel set and A, B be finite sets. Let q(-\s, i,j) be measurable and rx = -r2 = r be a nonnegative bounded measurable function on S. Further suppose I (II, T)(s) < k for all n, T, s. Then the positive stochastic game has a measurable value function and player II (minimizer) has an optimal stationary strategy. Assume that q(-\s, a, b) is measurable in s and continuous in (a, b) in the sense that qi-\s, a", bn) -» qi-\s, a0, b0) weakly whenever (an, bn) -» (a0, ¿>0). Finally, suppose that the multifunctions s^> F(s) = PA^ and s^G(s) = PB,S) are measurable. Then the discounted zero-sum stochastic game has a measurable value function and the two players have optimal stationary strategies.
Remarks. When S, A, B are finite, Theorem 1 is true without any restriction on yx, y2 and q [10] , [13] . Theorem 2 is also known when S, A, B are finite [12], [9] . A particular case of Theorem 3 is contained in [8] . The real problem in Theorem 1 is to topologize the space of strategies so that it becomes a compact metric space and so that sequential arguments and fixed point theorems could be applied. For the proof of Theorem 1 we need the following fac(s. Let M, and M2 be the space of all measurable functions from S -> PA and S-> PB respectively. Following Warga [15] we shall regard M,-after identifying functions coinciding almost everywhere-as a closed convex subset of the dual space of Rk valued integrable functions. With the weak* topology, M, and, in a similar fashion, M2 are compact metric.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from the following lemmas. T : u -»max Lemma 2. Let ug be the fixed point of the operator Tg. There exists a measurable function f: S -> PA such that «*(*) = rx{s,fis),gis)) + ßfug{s')dq{s'\s,fis),gis)).
This follows from a selection theorem due to Olech [7] . We can similarly define operators Lf and fixed points vfis) for the function + ßfug(-)dq(-\s,f'(s),g(s))a.e. and vf(s) = r2{s,fis),g'is)) + ßfvf{-)dq{-\s,fis),g'is))a.e. ).
The map t is upper-semicontinuous.
Proof. Since Mx is metrizable we can restrict ourselves to sequential arguments. Let (/", gn) -+ (/°, g°) and (£, g*n) G t(/", gn) with (£, g*) -* if*, g*). We have to show that if, g*) E t(/°, g°). We have "fe = rx(s,f:(s),gn(s)) + ßf ugn(s') dq{s'\s,f:{s),gn{s)) a.e. «fc = r2(s,fH(s),g*(s)) + ßfvfJs') dq{s'\s,fn{s),g:{s)) a.e.
Since {ugJ is a uniformly bounded subset of L, it has a convergent subsequence-without loss of generality {ug } itself-converging in the w* sense to some u0. Let £ is) = (#»>(,), . . . , |<»>(s)), f*is) = (£, is), ..., £,(,)). gn{s) = (,}->(,), . . . , n,"^)), g°is) = {Vx{s), ..., r,,is)).
Kis, i) = \ fuj-)dq'i-\s, i), W¿is, i) = i ]"«"(•) ^'(-Ií, i).
'>J) = \ fuj-)dq"(-\s,j), W¿'(s,f) = I |«0(.) ¿jr*(.|5,y). Observe that "g"(J) > >-iis,i,gnis)) + ßf"gS-)dqi-\s,i,gnis)) for all/ G>1,î G S.
Hence we can conclude that k0(j) > rx(s, i, g°(i)) + ßfu0i-) dq(-\s, i, g°(s)) a.e.
Hence u0is) satisfies the above functional equation a.e. Using a similar argument for vf one can prove t>o(*) = r2{s,fis), g*is)) + ßfv0(s') dq(s'\s,f°is), g*is)) a.e.
r2(s,fis),X) + ßfv0is') dq(s'\f(s),\) = max a.e.
This shows that if*, g*) G t(/°, g°).
We can imitate the same proof to show that t(/, g) is a closed set for each (/. g).
Lemma 4. There exists a p-equilibrium stationary pair if0, g°) for the two players.
Proof. The conditions of Kakutani-Glicksberg's fixed point theorem are satisfied for the map t in Lemma 3 [4] . Hence there exists an if0, g°) E t(/°, g°). Namely u0(s) = max rx (s, p, g°(s)) + ß fu0(s') dq(s'\s, u, g°(j)) = rx(s,f°is),g°is)) + ßfuQis') dq(s'\s,f(s),g°(s)) a.e., 249 a.e. v0is) = max A r2(s,f°(s),X) + ßfv0(s')dq(s'\s,f(s),\)
a.e. = r2(s,f°(s),g°(s)) + ßfv0(s') dq(s'\s,f°is),g°is)) a.e. Now we can assume the above equations to be exact over a set S, of p measure 1. Since q(-\s, i,j) </», í(S,|í, /',/) = 1 for all s, i,j. We can view the problem as a dynamic programming problem on Sx and hence we can conclude from Blackwell's Theorem (6f) in [2] that k0(í) = max 7,(n, g°)(s) = 7,(/°, g°)(s) for all s E Sx, v0(s) = max 72(/°, T)is) = 72(/°, g°)(s) for all s E Sx.
The equalities asserted above have in them maxima taken over plans in the dynamic programming problem and they are still true even if we allow behaviour strategies of the game problem. This can be done as in [6, Theorem 3.1] . This establishes that (/°, g°) is a /»-equilibrium pair. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 1. We are unable to prove the theorem when rx, r2 and q do not satisfy the separability conditions.
Remark 2. The notion of/»-optimality as formulated in this paper is due to R. Strauch [14] .
Proof of Theorem 2. Let 0 < ßn < 1 be any sequence increasing to 1. Since 7(n, T)(s) < K for all n, Y, s, the t>"'s are bounded. Also the ü"'s are monotone nondecreasing. Let vn -* v. We will show that v is the value of the positive stochastic game. Let /" be optimal for 7 for the game corresponding to ßn. We have /"(/", Y)(s) > vn(s) and 7(/", I» > /"(/", T)(s).
Here the income In corresponds to the case ßn and 7 refers to the case ß = 1. Thus sup inf 7(n, T)(s) > v(s). We will now show that inf sup7(n, T)(s) < vis). Here the existence of such a Borel measurable g follows from the theorem of Olech [7] . From a result of Blackwell [1] on positive dynamic programming it follows that vis) = snp IiU,g)is)
. n This equation is valid even for behaviour strategies of the game problem [6] . Hence we have vis) = inf sup 7(n, T)(s) = sup /(Il,g)(s) = sup inf 7(n,g)(s). r n n n r
This proves that the game has a value and player II has an optimal stationary strategy.
Remark. Player I (maximizer) need not have an optimal stationary strategy. For an example see [8] , [14] .
Proof of Theorem 3. It follows along similar lines as in [8] . However one has to rely on the following selection theorem proved recently [5] .
Selection Theorem [5] . Let (5, &) be a measurable space, X a separable metric space and Y a separable metric space. Let u: S X X -» Y be a function measurable in s and continuous in x,T: S -> X, a measurable multifunction with compact values and g: S -+ Y a measurable function such that gis) E m(ä X Vis)) for all s E S. Then there exists a measurable selector r: S -> X for V such that gis) «■ u(í, ris)) for all s in S.
